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Abstract 
A reduction in income tax rates generates substantial dynamic responses within the 
framework of the standard neoclassical growth model. The short-run revenue loss after an 
income tax cut is partly – or, depending on parameter values, even completely – offset by 
growth in the long-run, due to the resulting incentives to further accumulate capital. We study 
how the dynamic response of government revenue to a tax cut changes if we allow a Ramsey 
economy to engage in international trade: the open economy’s ability to reallocate resources 
between labor-intensive and capital-intensive industries reduces the negative effect of factor 
accumulation on factor returns, thus encouraging the economy to accumulate more than it 
would do under autarky. We explore the quantitative implications of this intuition for the US 
in terms of two issues recently treated in the literature: dynamic scoring and the Laffer curve. 
Our results demonstrate that international trade enhances the response of government revenue 
to tax cuts by a relevant amount. In our benchmark calibration, a reduction in the capital-
income tax rate has virtually no effect on government revenue in steady state. 
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the dynamic response of government revenues to income tax cuts in an
environment in which countries can trade and specialize according to their comparative
advantages. In particular, we construct a model in which two Ramsey economies specialize
according to their factor abundance. We show that the long-run negative e¤ect of a
reduction in a countrys capital-income tax rate on government revenues is much smaller
than in the standard closed-economy Ramsey model.
The di¤erent behavior of the closed and open economies can be understood in terms
of the di¤erent ways their sectorial factor allocation mechanisms work. A reduction in the
capital-income tax rate raises the after-tax return to capital, thus creating an incentive
to accumulate capital. Under autarky, an increase in the aggregate capital-labor ratio
implies higher sectorial capital intensities; the diminishing marginal productivity of cap-
ital therefore reduces the return to capital and thereby the incentive to accumulate. In
the open economy, instead, capital-labor intensities do not respond to increases in the
aggregate capital-labor ratio that much, as resources are reallocated from labor-intensive
to capital-intensive industries. This enables the open economy to accumulate capital
without a¤ecting the gross return to capital as much as under autarky. Obviously, this
generates a stronger reaction of capital income to the initial tax cut, and therefore reduces
the negative impact of the tax cut on government revenues.
To assess the quantitative relevance of this intuition, we calibrate our dynamic two-
country model with the US and the rest of the world in mind, and compute the short-run
and long-run responses of government revenue to tax cuts. We relate our results to
two issues, dynamic scoring and the La¤er curve, that have been treated recently in the
literature:
First, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) criticize the way the Congressional Budget O¢ ce
and the Joint Committee on Taxation score the proposed legislation each time the US
Congress considers tax policy changes: the way the revenue impact of tax changes is
calculated is usually referred to as static scoring, because it ignores the feedback e¤ect
from tax changes to any macroeconomic variable.1 Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) take a
rm stand in favor of dynamic scoring: they use a closed-economy Ramsey model to show
that the short-run response of government revenues to tax-rate changes is always stronger
than the long-run response.2
Second, in a more recent reference, Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) use the neoclassical
growth model to characterize the shape of the La¤er curve in the US and Europe. They
nd that both the US and Europe are on the upward sloping side of the La¤er curve;
however, they point out that Europe is quite close to the La¤er curves slippery slope,
that is, its downward sloping side.
Regarding dynamic scoring, we nd that our dynamic trade model generates a much
larger response on the factor accumulation side to a tax cut than in the autarky model,
as we discussed above.3 In our benchmark calibration, for example, a capital tax cut is
able to nance itself in the long run, whereas the dynamic response to the tax cut in
the autarky economy only compensates for 50% of the short-run revenue loss. As for the
1It is static from a macroeconomic point of view only, because feedback e¤ects from microdynamic
behaviour are incorporated into the forecast. For details, see Auerbach (1996).
2Leeper and Yang (2006) point out that the results of Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) are sensitive to
their assumption on how government decits are nanced.
3In fairness to Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006), we should point out that they are aware of the open-
economy model yielding a stronger dynamic e¤ect. See section 3.6 in their paper.
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La¤er curve, we nd that the US reaches the slippery side:the actual average US tax
rate on capital income is 27:3%, while the revenue-maximizing tax rate in our model, the
peak of the La¤er curve, equals 26:7%. In contrast, under autarky, the peak of the La¤er
curve occurs at a tax rate of 50:7%.
The main intuition of our paper is based on Ventura (1997), who shows, in the context
of the neoclassical growth model, that the negative e¤ect of capital accumulation on the
return to capital is reduced by free trade. Although insightful and elegant, the Ventura
model turns out not to be a very useful workhorse for performing a quantitative exercise
of the kind we have in mind, since it yields international factor price equalization. First of
all, this is obviously not a very realistic feature when contrasted with the data; secondly,
the treatment of steady states in the presence of taxation becomes somewhat tricky, as
the equalization of before-tax interest rates implies di¤erent after-tax interest rates if
capital-income taxation di¤ers across countries. Therefore, for our calibration exercise we
produce a model based on Cuñat and Ma¤ezzoli (2007), which is a dynamic generalization
of Dornbusch et al. (1980). This set-up enables us to model Heckscher-Ohlin trade with
trade frictions and therefore no factor price equalization (both important features in
reality) in a rather straightforward way.4
The link between taxation and international trade is obviously not new. Whalley
(1980) is a good example of a Computable General Equilibriummodel of taxation and
international trade, which compares the welfare implications of tax policies under autarky
and trade,5 while Epifani and Gancia (2007) studies the empirical relationship between
international trade and the size of the government. In the realm of macroeconomics, Bax-
ter (1992) shows that changes in taxation can a¤ect cross-country specialization patterns
within a dynamic model of Ricardian comparative advantage.6
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 lays out a rather general
dynamic trade model; in section 3 we develop some intuition by working out a very
particular case, while in section 4 we simulate a more realistic version of the model;
section 5 checks the sensitivity and robustness of our results; nally, section 6 presents
our concluding remarks.
2 The Model
This and the next two sections present the dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model with which
we study the dynamic e¤ects of tax cuts. We rst sketch out the main ingredients of the
model economy; then solve for a particular case analytically; nally, we calibrate a more
realistic, albeit less tractable, case.
4See Romalis (2004) for empirical evidence supporting this models predictions.
5See Shoven and Whalley (1984) for a survey of CGE models of taxation and international trade.
6The closed-economy literature on taxation in a dynamic set-up is obviously vast. We just mention
here a couple of examples based on the endogenous-growth literature: (i) Bruce and Turnovsky (1999)
present a dynamic scoring exercise with the main focus on the sustainability of the scal balance of
the government. (ii) Novales and Ruiz (2002) use a numerically simulated endogenous growth model to
compare the feasible pairs of tax rates on capital and labour from a welfare point of view, where feasibility
is constrained by a minimal level of government consumption. It is worth mentioning also Backus et al.
(2007), who study the empirical relationship between di¤erent measures of e¤ective tax rates on capital
and the cross-country dispersion of capital-labor ratios for a group of OECD countries.
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2.1 The Representative Households Problem
Countries, indexed by j, are populated each by a continuum of identical households that
can be aggregated into a single representative household. The representative household
owns the capital stock and supplies capital and labor services inelastically; and either
consumes or invests a nal good. Governments collect taxes on factors of production
(with possibly di¤erent rates applied to capital K and labour L); government revenues
are paid back to households via lump-sum transfers. The representative households
preferences over consumption streams can be summarized by the following intertemporal
utility function:
Uj =
TX
t=0
t
C
1  1

jt   1
1  1

; (1)
where  is the subjective intertemporal discount factor, and  the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. T denotes the representative households time horizon; C denotes
consumption of the nal good. The representative households maximize equation (1)
subject to the following intratemporal budget constraint
Pjt (Cjt + Ijt) =
 
1  Lj

wjtLjt +
 
1  Kj

rjtKjt +Rjt; (2)
where P is the price of the nal good; I denotes investment; r and w are factor prices;
L and K are the tax rates on labor and capital, respectively; and
Rjt = 
L
j wjtLjt + 
K
j rjtKjt (3)
denotes government transfers (we simplify by assuming a balanced government budget).
Factor prices are taken as given by the representative household. The capital stocks evolve
according to the following accumulation equation:
Kjt+1 = (1  )Kjt + Ijt; (4)
where  2 [0; 1] is the depreciation rate.7 Lj is assumed constant. The rst-order condi-
tions
C
  1

jt+1
 
1  Kj
 rjt+1
Pjt+1
+ 1  

= C
  1

jt ; (5)
Kjt+1 =
 
1  Lj
 wjt
Pjt
Ljt +
 
1  Kj
 rjt
Pjt
+ 1  

Kjt +
Rjt
Pjt
  Cjt; (6)
and the corresponding transversality condition are necessary and su¢ cient for the repre-
sentative households problem. A recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is
characterized by equations (5)-(6) together with the equations that determine prices in
the staticequilibrium, to be discussed below.
2.2 Equilibrium Prices
Capital and labor are assumed to be internationally immobile. In each period, prices are
determined in a staticequilibrium, where we consider both autarky and trade.8
7For the sake of notational simplicity, we ignore exogenous technical progress. This does not a¤ect
our results signicantly.
8For convenience, in this section we avoid time subscripts on variables, which might vary over time.
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2.2.1 The Final Good
The nal good, which is assumed to be nontradable, is produced under perfect competition
with a continuum of intermediate goods. The representative rm operating in the nal
good sector maximizes prots subject to a Cobb-Douglas production function, taking all
prices as given:
max
fxj(z)g
PjYj  
Z 1
0
pj(z)xj(z)dz (7)
s.t. Yj = exp
Z 1
0
lnxj(z)dz

; (8)
where x (z) denotes the quantity of intermediate good z used, and p(z) the corresponding
price. The demand for intermediate good z is given by
xj(z) =
PjYj
pj (z)
; (9)
where
Pj = exp
Z 1
0
ln pj(z)dz

: (10)
2.2.2 Intermediate Goods
Intermediate goods are produced also under perfect competition. The representative inter-
mediate producer in industry z maximizes prots subject to a Cobb-Douglas production
function taking all prices as given:
max
fkj(z);lj(z)g
pj(z)yj(z)  rjkj(z)  wjlj(z) (11)
s.t. yj(z) = jkj(z)
(z)lj(z)
1 (z); (12)
where (z) 2 [0; 1] denotes the capital share in industry z, k (z) and l (z) the capital and
labor allocated to the production of intermediate good z, respectively, and j is a time-
invariant country-specic technology parameter. Capital-labor intensities are assumed to
be increasing in z, i.e. 0(z) > 0. Technologies are identical across countries, but for the
exogenous factor-augmenting coe¢ cients j.
The unit-cost function associated to the dual of (11)-(12) is given by
b(z; j; rj; wj) =
r
(z)
j w
1 (z)
j
ja(z)
; (13)
where a (z)   (z)(z) [1   (z)]1 (z) is an industry-specic constant.
Intermediate goods can be traded. We model trade frictions as iceberg-type transport
costs:   1 units of a good must be shipped from the country of origin for one unit to
arrive to the country of destination.  = 1 therefore corresponds to free trade. A high
enough  yields autarky instead.
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2.2.3 Autarky Equilibrium Prices
Assume that  is such that intermediate goods are not traded. Choosing the nal good
as the numeraire, the autarky static equilibrium conditions (discussed in the appendix)
yield the following equilibrium factor prices (before tax):
rj = jA

1  ~
~
~ 1
Kj
Lj
~ 1
; (14)
wj = jA

1  ~
~
~
Kj
Lj
~
; (15)
where A  exp
hR 1
0
ln a(z)dz
i
, and
~ =
Z 1
0
(z)dz (16)
is the autarky economys aggregate capital share.9
It is also easy to show that the allocation of labor to each sector is a constant fraction
of the economys total amount of labor:
lj (z) =
1   (z)
1  ~ Lj: (17)
Finally, sectorial capital-labor intensities move one-to-one with the economys aggregate
capital-labor ratio:
kj (z)
lj (z)
=
 (z)
1   (z)
wj
rj
=
 (z)
1   (z)
1  ~
~
Kj
Lj
: (18)
2.2.4 Trade Equilibrium Prices
We consider two cases here: a free-trade scenario, in which factor prices are equalized
across countries; and a more realistic scenario, in which trade frictions prevent the Law
of One Price from holding. Below we use the free-trade case to produce an analytically
solvable example providing some intuition; the case with trade frictions is used in the
quantitative section of the paper.
Free Trade Assume  = 1. For simplicity, consider a worldwide factor price equaliza-
tion (FPE) equilibrium, in which the world as a whole (the integrated equilibrium) works
as the autarky economy described above. Provided that countries do not have capital-
labor ratios that are too di¤erentfrom the worlds aggregate capital-labor ratio, then
they will not be completely specialized, and will have the integrated equilibriums factor
prices.10 This implies factor prices are independent of the countrys own factor endow-
ments. A direct implication of this is the independence of sectorial capital-labor intensities
from the countrys own capital-labor ratio.
9The autarky version of the model is equivalent to a one-sector Ramsey model with a Cobb-Douglas
production technology of the form Yj = jAK
~
j L
1 ~
j ; our closed-economy framework is thus comparable
to similar papers in the literature.
10Below we make sure that the small open economy is in the FPE set.
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Trade Frictions Assume there are two countries, North and South, indexed by j =
N;S, respectively. We assume that the North is capital abundant, i.e. KN=LN > KS=LS,
and therefore has a comparative advantage in the production of capital-intensive goods.
Intermediate goods can be traded, but not freely:  > 1.11 A trading equilibrium is
characterized by two cut-o¤values 0  zN < zS  1, that divide the range of intermediate
goods into three subregions:
1. The intermediate goods z 2 [0; zN) are exclusively produced in the South and
shipped to the North.
2. The intermediate goods z 2 [zN ; zS] are produced in both countries and nontraded.
These commodities are not worth shipping from one country to another despite
comparative advantage. This is due to the price wedge the trade cost introduces
between countries.
3. The intermediate goods z 2 (zS; 1] are exclusively produced in the North and
shipped to the South.
The corresponding equilibrium conditions are discussed in the appendix. For further
details, see Cuñat and Ma¤ezzoli (2007).
3 A Simple Free-trade Case
Let us rst address the free-trade case, which we can solve analytically. Assume Kj0 > 0,
T = 1,  = 1 (log-utility),  = 0,  = 1 (free trade), Lj = 0 and j = 1. We will use the
nal good as the numeraire: P = 1. Furthermore, for the sake of notational simplicity,
we will drop time and country indexes, since they turn out to be redundant under the
assumptions imposed in this Section. The Euler equation (5) can then be rewritten as:
 (Y0   I0)

1 +
 
1  K r1 = Y1 +K1; (19)
where:
Y0 = r0K0 + w0L; (20)
I0 = K1  K0: (21)
The transversality condition associated to the representative households maximization
problem is simply K2 = 0.
11For the autarky equilibrium to be sustainable, at autarky prices transport costs must make it pointless
to ship goods across countries. In other words, it has to be the case that
b(0; N ; rN ; wN )  b(0; S ; rS ; wS);
b(1; S ; rS ; wS)  b(1; N ; rN ; wN );
where rj and wj are the autarky prices described above. This implies that, if (wN=rN ) = (wS=rS) =
(KN=LN ) = (KS=LS)  
2
(1) (0) , autarky will take place. If, on the other hand, (KN=LN ) = (KS=LS) >

2
(1) (0) , autarky will not be sustainable and countries will trade.
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3.1 Autarky Economy
The Euler equation (19) implicitly solves for K1. We can now study the dynamic implica-
tions of changes in taxation (around this equilibrium). By the Implicit Function Theorem,
we can compute the e¤ect of changes in K on capital accumulation:
dK1
dK

A
=
 r1 (Y0   I0)
1 + r1 + 
n
1 + (1  K) r1
h
~+ (1  ~) Y0+K0
K1
io < 0; (22)
as Y0 I0 > 0. A fall in K raises the after-tax return to capital, thus encouraging further
capital accumulation.
The e¤ect of K on period-1 gross interest rate is also easy to compute:
dr1
dK

A
=
dr1
dK1
dK1
dK

A
= (~  1)A

1  ~
~
~ 1
K1
L
~ 2
dK1
dK

A
> 0: (23)
For future reference, it will be useful to also compute
dr1=d
K
r1

A
= (~  1) dK1=d
K
K1

A
> 0: (24)
The gross return to capital falls with the aggregate capital-labor ratio due to the dimin-
ishing marginal productivity of capital: from (18), it is easy to see that sectorial capital
intensities rise with the economys aggregate capital-labor ratio. Thus, the e¤ect of a
reduction in K on government revenue has two opposing components: an increase in the
capital stock, and a reduction in its gross return.
3.2 Small Open Economy
For simplicity, consider a factor price equalization (FPE) equilibrium, in which the world
(the integrated equilibrium) has got a capital-labor ratio with a time path identical to
that of the autarky economy above. Consider a small open economy that has got the
same initial condition K0 and parameter values as in the autarky equilibrium. Since this
economy faces the same factor prices of the autarky economy, the Euler equation (19)
must yield the same solution for K1 as under autarky.12
Once again, by the Implicit Function Theorem, we can compute the e¤ect of changes
in K on capital accumulation (around this equilibrium):
dK1
dK

O
=
 r1 (Y0   I0)
1 + r1 +  [1 + (1  K) r1] < 0: (25)
Comparing (22) and (25), it is easy to see that the e¤ect of a tax cut on K1 is larger
under free trade than under autarky, as Y0 +K0 > K1:13 dK1dK

O
 >  dK1dK

A
 : (26)
Since commodity prices are given for the small open economy,
dr1
dK

O
= 0: (27)
12In the FPE jargon, our open economy is on the diagonal of the FPE set in both periods.
13The rest of variables and parameters in equations (22) and (25) are identical.
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The di¤erent behavior of the closed and open economies can be understood as due to
the di¤erent ways their factor allocation mechanisms work. A reduction in  raises the
after-tax return to capital in both economies, creating an incentive to raise K1. Under
autarky, an increase inK1 implies higher sectorial capital-labor intensities; the diminishing
marginal productivity of capital thereby reduces the return to capital and, therefore, the
incentive to accumulate. In the open economy, instead, capital-labor intensities do not
respond to increases in the aggregate capital-labor ratio, and the marginal productivity of
capital therefore does not fall: full employment of resources is achieved by a reallocation
of resources from labor-intensive to capital-intensive industries. Openness to trade allows
this reshu­ ing of the economys production structure. This enables the open economy to
accumulate capital without a¤ecting the gross return to capital.14
3.3 Tax Revenues
Let us now compare the e¤ect of a tax cut on government revenues, R = KrK, in the
closed and open economy. Recall that the autarky and open economies have got the same
R before the tax cut. Di¤erentiating R1 with respect to K :
dR1
dK
= r1K1

1 + K
dr1=d
K
r1
+ K
dK1=d
K
K1

; (28)
or, in growth rates,
dR1=d
K
R1
=
1
K
+
dr1=d
K
r1
+
dK1=d
K
K1
: (29)
Our results above on the responses of K1 and r1 to changes in K imply that under free
trade the tax cut is less costly for the government in terms of period-2 revenue than under
autarky:
dR1=d
K
R1

A
  dR1=d
K
R1

O
=
= ~
dK1=d
K
K1

A
  dK1=d
K
K1

O
> (~  1) dK1=d
K
K1

A
> 0: (30)
This example suggests that openness and autarky display non-trivial quantitative di¤er-
ences in the e¤ects of taxation.
4 Trade with Frictions
Although intuitive, the simple case above is based on a quite unrealistic scenario: free
trade, and therefore FPE, are hampered by trade frictions. One other technicalproblem
of the dynamic FPE model is that its innite-horizon case is not that straightforward:
the steady-state condition equalizing the after-tax return to capital and the rate of time
preference may not hold for all countries if they have got di¤erent tax rates, or if their
tax rates change. This is due to the before-tax return to capital being equal across
countries. This makes steady-state comparisons of the kind Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006)
and Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) perform impossible, unless the rate of time preference
is assumed endogenous. To study the quantitative aspects of the issue more in detail,
14See Ventura (1997).
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therefore, we turn to the trade-frictions scenario we discussed in section 2. Below we
discuss that the intuitions of both models, with and without frictions, are similar.
Assume  > 1 and T = 1. It turns out to be convenient to choose a di¤erent
numeraire this time: pS (0) = 1. In the appendix we show that in order to remain in
a steady state with trading equilibrium in which KN=LN > KS=LS, we need to impose
that
 
1  KN

N >
 
1  KS

S.
15 This assumption, together with the condition that
equalizes the steady-state after-tax real rates of return across countries, 
1  KN
 rN
PN
=
 
1  KS
 rS
PS
; (31)
enables us to solve the equilibrium conditions for the steady state of the model numeri-
cally. We characterize both the autarky and trading equilibrium in order to compare the
dynamic feedback for the two di¤erent regimes.
4.1 Calibration
To perform our quantitative exercise, we calibrate our trade model in terms of the US
(the capital-abundant North) vs. the Rest of the World (the labor-abundant South).
The basic parametrization is taken from Cuñat and Ma¤ezzoli (2007): we set  = 1,
 = 0:96, and  = 0:048. We normalize the size of the world labor endowment setting
LW  LN +LS = 2; according to data from Heston et al. (2006), roughly 5% of the global
labor force is employed in the US economy: therefore, we set LN = 0:05LW .
Anderson and vanWincoop (2004) show that trade costs represent a 170% ad-valorem-
tax-equivalent trade barrier for a representative rich country. This number breaks down
into a 55% of local trade costs and a 74% of international trade costs. Abstracting
away from local distribution costs, we assign the value of  to represent the ad valorem
equivalent of international trade costs, i.e. we set  = 1:74.
The capital intensity function (z) is a key ingredient in our model; to parametrize
it, we start by noting that, given the Cobb-Douglas production functions for intermedi-
ate goods, the capital intensity should be directly related to the capital shares in value
added at the sectorial level. Taking advantage of the Gross Domestic Product by Indus-
try published by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, we collect data on Value Added
(VA), Compensation of Employees (COMP), Proprietors Income (PROINC), Propri-
etorsIncome Inventory Valuation Adjustment (PROIVA), Full-time Equivalent Employ-
ees (FTE), and Persons Engaged in Production (PEP), for 56 US sectors, dened accord-
ing to the SIC87 classication, over the 1987-97 period.16 These data allow us to compute
15We are simply imposing the condition that, for identical capital-labor ratios in both countries, the
after-tax marginal productivity of capital be larger in country N . If, for example, N = S , N = S ,
and KN = 
K
S , both countries would have the same capital-labor ratio in steady state, and there would be
no trade. Note that we introduce cross-country di¤erences in TFP levels only to guarantee the existence
of international trade in steady state: the actual trade ows are generated by the induced di¤erences in
relative factor endowments. Hence, if TFP levels were equal across countries, trade could nonetheless
emerge during converge towards the steady state. A large literature on cross-country comparison of TFP
levels, summarized in Caselli Caselli (2005), provides empirical evidence that supporting the existence of
international di¤erences in TFP levels.
16We drop the government sector and the housing sector, because by construction they include respec-
tively only labor and capital income. See Gomme and Rupert (2004) for a discussion. Furthermore, and
for similar reasons, we drop Educational services, Social services, Private households, and Membership
organizations. See the appendix for a full list of the sectors included.
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the labor share in value added at the sectorial level. We follow the two most common ap-
proaches in the literature to account for the labor income of self employed workers.17 The
rst approach assigns the average wage perceived by employees to self-employed workers,
and therefore our rst estimate of the labor share is computed as
sN =
COMP
FTE
PEP
V A
: (32)
The second approach recognizes that the main problem is the apportionment of propri-
etorsincome, which has components of both labor and capital income, since it mainly
represents income of self-employed individuals. We assume that proprietors income, net
of inventory valuation adjustment, should be allocated to labor and capital in the same
proportions they represent in the remainder of the economy. In other words, our second
estimate of the labor share is computed as
sN =
COMP
V A  PROINC   PROIV A: (33)
These two estimates turn out to be highly positively correlated (with a coe¢ cient around
0:96); however, some relevant di¤erences, in particular for labor-intensive sectors, remain.
Since both are rough approximations of the true labor share, and both probably capture
some distinct aspects of reality, we take the average of these two alternative estimates as
our benchmark distribution. The capital share in value added is simply computed as one
minus the labor share. Finally, we order the sectors according to their capital share and
get the desired monotonically increasing cross-sector distribution of capital intensity. We
approximate the latter with an algebraic polynomial of order 6, tted using ordinary least
squares.
In a closed-economy environment, this would be the end of the story; however, under
trade, there is still a further important step. In our numerical experiment, the North, i.e.
the US economy, is assumed to be the capital-abundant country. Hence, the distribution
of capital shares actually observed in the US should correspond to the right-hand tail of
the true distribution, i.e. the [zN ; 1] interval in our notation. In other words, by focusing
on the US sectorial data, we may get an estimate of the highest capital intensity, but not,
under trade, an estimate of the lowest one. To bypass this problem, we use the previously
tted polynomial to extrapolate on the left-hand side of the distribution until we hit the
horizontal axis, assuming implicitly that the lowest possible capital share is zero. Finally,
the domain of this extendeddistribution is mapped into the [0; 1] interval. Figure 1
plots the actual US distribution and the tted polynomial.18 The tted polynomial is
then used in our simulations.
Carey and Rabesona (2002) compute average e¤ective tax rates on factors of pro-
duction and consumption for 25 OECD countries, extending the Mendoza et al. (1994)
methodology: from their Table A2, p. 172, we take the tax rates on capital (based on
17See Gomme and Rupert (2004) for a recent discussion of the issues at stake, and Cooley and Prescott
(1995) for a classical reference.
18In autarky, these values imply an aggregate capital share equal to 0:34, which is close to the 0:33
used in Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) and the 0:36 used in Trabandt and Uhlig (2006). In the trading
equilibrium, these values together with the calibrated values of the productivity parameters imply a
capital share of 0:37 in the North and 0:33 in the South. Furthermore, the steady-state value of zN in
our model economy reaches 0:037, a value almost identical to its empirical counterpart, as obtained in
our calibration procedure, equal to 0:034.
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Figure 1: The sectorial distribution of capital shares in VA in the US (1987-1997).
gross operating surplus) and labor for the 1990-2000 period.19 We set the tax rates in
the North to reproduce the observed US rates, i.e. KN = 27:3% and 
L
N = 23:4%; to
pin down the tax rates in the South, instead, we compute weighted averages of the tax
rates on capital and labor for the remaining countries, using the real GDP-PPP levels
reported by Heston et al. (2006) for the 1990-2000 period as weights: the resulting values
are KS = 28:0% and 
L
S = 30:5%.
20
We are left with the country-specic productivity parameters, j; to pin their values
down, we (i) normalize the world capital stock setting KW  KN + KS = 2, and (ii)
calibrate the model to reproduce the observed ratio between the capital-labor ratio in
the US and the capital-labor ratio in a Rest-of-the-World aggregate, averaged over the
1990-2000 period, equal to 4:9.21. The implied values are N = 0:778 and S = 0:306.
19As Carey and Rabesona (2002) point out, the scal treatment of depreciation allowances is di¤erent
across countries, making tax rates based on net operating surplus di¢ cult to compare across countries.
20We found no reliable data source for tax rates outside the OECD. Note that our results do not stem
from di¤erences in scal policy across countries: they do not change qualitatively - and even quantitatively
only slightly - if we use the same tax structure in both countries for our model.
21We collect data from Heston et al. (2006) for 140 countries over the 1950-2003 period on population
(pop), real GDP per capita (rgdpl and rgdpch-9, real GDP per worker (rgdpwok), and real investment
as a share of GDP (ki). Following Caselli (2005), we construct estimates for the net physical capital
stock using the Perpetual Inventory Method; we assume innite service lives and a constant geometric
depreciation rate equal to 6% for all countries. The capital-labor ratio is computed as the ratio between
our estimate of the capital stock and the labor force. Finally, the RoW aggregate is just computed as the
total capital stock in the world, but for the US, over the total labor force, again excluding the US. To
check the robustness of these results, we produced alternative estimates assuming xed expected service
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As already noted before,
 
1  KN

N >
 
1  KN

S implies KN=LN > KS=LS, so that
trade may arise in steady state. The trade share in income (imports plus exports over
GDP) generated by our benchmark calibration reaches 7:3%, which is far below the actual
overall trade share of the US (21% on average over the 1990-2000 period), but near the
US share in income of trade with developing countries (8:7%),22 a group of countries
for which US trade is likely to be explained to a great extent by di¤erences in relative
factor endowments. The fact that our model generates less trade than the observed is not
so surprising, as we ignore Ricardian comparative advantage and New-Trade Theory
features such as product di¤erentiation and scale economies.
The recursive structure of our problem guarantees that the solution can be represented
as a couple of time-invariant policy functions expressing the optimal level of consumption
in each country as a function of the two state variables, KN and KS. These policy
functions have to satisfy the following functional equations:
Cj (K
0
N ; K
0
S)
  1

 
1  Kj

r0j=P
0
j + 1  

= Cj (KN ; KS)
  1
 ; (34)
where:
K 0j =
 
1  Lj
 wj
Pj
Lj +
 
1  Kj
 rj
Pj
+ 1  

Kj +
Rj
Pj
  Cj (KN ; KS) (35)
The real prices wj=Pj and rj=Pj are obtained by numerically solving the appropriate
equilibrium conditions. To solve equations (34) numerically, we apply the Orthogonal
Collocation projection method described in Judd (1992).
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Dynamic Scoring
This section studies the dynamic e¤ects of an unexpected and permanent one-percentage-
point reduction in the tax rate on capital income in the North, which in our experiment
has been calibrated to reproduce the US economy. Figure 2 summarizes the impulse
response of the main macroeconomic variables to such a tax cut. We plot income, capital,
consumption, together with the trade share in income, under both trade and autarky for
comparison purposes. All variables are expressed in real terms and as percent deviations
from their initial steady-state value. The left-hand panels report results for the North,
while the right-hand panels report the corresponding results for the South.
A capital-income tax cut in the North seems benecial in terms of higher income and
consumption in steady state, under both autarky and trade. Notice, however, that from a
quantitative point of view the long-run e¤ect under trade is more than twice larger than
under autarky. As already noted, this is due to the di¤erent ways the factor allocation
mechanisms work under the two regimes. A reduction in KN raises the after-tax return
to capital in the North, creating an incentive to accumulate capital. Under autarky,
capital accumulation implies higher sectorial capital-labor intensities: given diminishing
marginal returns, this reduces the return to capital and the incentive to accumulate. In
lives (20 years), simultaneous exit mortality patterns, and linear depreciation, as in Ma¤ezzoli (2006):
the outcomes are almost identical.
22We collect data from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics - International merchandise trade by
region on US trade with developing countries over the 1990-2000 time period. A detailed list of the
countries involved can be found on www.unctad.org.
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Figure 2: The e¤ects of a capital tax cut in the North: main aggregate variables.
the trade model with transport costs, instead, an increase in KN=LN leads to an increase
in zN .23 This enables the North to accommodate part of the increase in its aggregate
capital-labor ratio not through a rise in sectorial capital-labor intensities, k (z) =l (z), but
by reshu­ ing resources from industries with low relative demand for capital (over labor)
towards industries with high relative demand for capital. This enables the open economy
to accumulate more capital, since the e¤ect of capital accumulation on the gross return
to capital is much smaller than under autarky.
In autarky, the South remains completely una¤ected by tax cuts in the North. Under
trade, however, factor prices in the South are inuenced by the Norths tax cut: the re-
sulting increase in KN=LN not only raises zN , but also reduces zS. The South therefore
reallocates factors from its most capital intensive industries to more labor intensive in-
dustries. This brings about a reduction in the Souths return to capital: while the North
accumulates capital, the opposite takes place in the South. The latter starts to eat up its
capital stock, and ends up in steady state with lower capital, output, and consumption.
This process further enhances its comparative advantage in labor intensive goods, and
spurs an increase in international trade. These results suggest that scal policy decisions
may have some spillover e¤ects via international trade, and that the ongoing integration
process may further enhance these e¤ects in the future.
23The change in zN is proportional to the change in the Norths trade share: the value of Norths
imports is Z zN
0
pN (z)xN (z) dz = zNPNYN :
Thus, the Norths trade share is 2zN .
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Figure 3: The e¤ects of a capital tax cut in the North: government balances.
Figure 3 summarizes the dynamic response of government balances along the transi-
tional path. Panels (a) and (b) (as before, North on the left-hand side and South on the
right-hand side) plot the adjustment path for government revenues, while panels (c) and
(d) report the share of capital taxes in government revenues; both variables are expressed
in percentage deviation from their initial steady-state value. Panels (e) and (f) show the
present-value net scal position of the government at di¤erent time horizons, dened asPt
s=0 jsRjsPt
s=0 jsRj; 1
where jt is the discount factor along the transitional path. This variable shows the
amount of resources the government should borrow or lend, in terms of the present dis-
counted value of its initial revenue plan Rj; 1, to keep the level of its revenues at the
same level as before the tax-cut. If its value is positive, then the tax cut pays for itself
as the government could lend some of its revenues and still keep its expenditureat their
original level.24
Panel (g) plots the dynamic feedback, which measures over time the extent to which
a tax cut is self-nancing in levels. Let us dene the static e¤ect of a tax cut as the
revenue loss induced by the tax cut under the assumption that none of the variables
adjust: hence, the static loss always equals to the change in the tax rate times the initial
tax base. The share of the static e¤ect which is dynamically o¤set by factor accumulation
can be calculated as
 
Rjt   Rj

=j Rjj, where  Rj denotes the static e¤ect. If the
tax cut is more than self-nancing, then the change in government revenues is positive
24The discount rate corresponds to the rental rate on capital net of taxes and depreciation.
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Time Gov. revenues Net scal position
Autarky Trade Autarky Trade
Both North South Both North South
Elasticities
Impact  0:37  0:40 0 :00  0:37  0:40 0 :00
5  0:31  0:32  0 :00  0:34  0:36  0 :00
10  0:26  0:24  0 :01  0:31  0:32  0 :01
25  0:20  0:10  0 :03  0:27  0:24  0 :01
1  0:18 0:00  0 :05  0:24  0:17  0 :02
Dynamic feedbacks
Impact 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
5 0:17 0:21 0:09 0:11
10 0:30 0:42 0:16 0:21
25 0:46 0:76 0:28 0:40
1 0:51 1:01 0:36 0:59
Table 1: Dynamic feedbacks after a capital tax cut in the North
and the dynamic feedback is larger than one; if the tax cut is only partially self-nancing,
then the change in government revenues is negative but larger (smaller in absolute value)
than the static e¤ect and the dynamic feedback lies between zero and one. Panel (h)
plots the present-value dynamic feedback, which shows the extent to which a tax cut is
self nancing in present discounted values and is computed asPt
s=0 jsRjs  
Pt
s=0 j0
RjPt
s=0 j0
 Rj ; (36)
where j0 is the discount factor at the initial steady-state. The value of the present
value feedback has the same interpretation as the dynamic feedback: if the tax cut is
self-nancing, then it is more than one; if the tax cut is partially self-nancing, then it is
between zero and one.
Table 1 summarizes the dynamic response of government revenues and the net scal
position, for the North and the South, and under autarky and trade. The upper part of
the table reports the elasticities of both variables with respect to changes in KN , while
the lower part reports the dynamic feedbacks, as dened above.
In the North, the tax cut impacts negatively government revenues under both autarky
and trade. Actually, this negative impact turns out to be slightly larger under trade,
since the elasticity on impact equals  0:37 under autarky and  0:40 under trade: this is
a direct consequence of the Norths higher steady-state capital-labor ratio in the trading
equilibrium. In the South, the tax cut that took place in the other country has no
e¤ect on impact, but under trade has a signicantly negative and permanent e¤ect on
government revenues in the long run. In both countries, these e¤ects stem from the
di¤erent adjustment paths for capital: enhanced capital accumulation in the North, the
reverse process in the South. Note that this mechanism explains why in the North the
actual decrease in government revenues in the long run is denitively smaller under trade
than under autarky: in the former case, government revenues almost converge back to
the initial steady-state value.
The role of capital accumulation is clearly reected in Figure 3, panels (c) and (d): the
share of capital taxes in total tax revenues increases steadily in the North and decreases
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Figure 4: The La¤er curve in the North.
in the South. Panels (e) and (f) show that, if we focus on the net nancial position,
the government in the North is clearly better o¤ under trade, while exactly the opposite
happens in the South. Finally, panels (g) and (h), and the lower part of Table 1, e¤ectively
summarize these results in terms of dynamic feedbacks: under autarky, the dynamic
feedback in the North converges in the long run to 51%, a value comparable to the ndings
of Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006); under trade, the long-run value of the corresponding
dynamic feedback converges to 101%. This implies that, in the (very) long run, a capital
tax cut does not decrease government revenues in the North; on the contrary, it actually
improves them slightly. Of course, given that this e¤ect relies on capital accumulation
and therefore needs time to build up, the results are less dramatic, but still relevant, if
we turn our attention to the present-value dynamic feedback.
4.2.2 The La¤er Curve
Dynamic scoring studies how tax cuts a¤ect government revenues in the long run and
along the transitional path to the new steady state. A closely related approach studies
the relationship between steady-state total tax revenues and di¤erent tax rates on capital
and labor, typically represented by the La¤er curve. Figure 4 plots the La¤er curve in
the North resulting from our model: it plots steady-state total tax revenues as a function
of the average tax rate on capital, ceteris paribus.
There are two features of the La¤er curve that are worth mentioning. First of all, note
that the La¤er curve under trade lies always above, or at least corresponds to, the La¤er
curve under autarky. This is of course a direct consequence of specialization: the North
will specialize in the production of capital-intensive goods, and this will induce further
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Parameter Trade Dynamic feedback Revenue max.
value share in steady state tax rate
Gov. rev. Net. scal pos.
Distribution of capital shares,  (z)
No extrapolation 5:5% 1:02 0:59 26:4%
Benchmark 7:3% 1:01 0:59 26:7%
Two-sided extrap. 11:6% 1:10 0:60 25:5%
Trade cost, 
1:70 10:7% 0:98 0:57 27:2%
1:74 7:3% 1:01 0:59 26:7%
1:79 3:3% 1:05 0:61 26:1%
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis: capital intensities and trade costs.
capital accumulation and therefore generate a higher capital stock in steady state. The
return has to be the same, in steady state, under both trade regimes, and therefore the
overall revenues from capital taxes will be higher. Furthermore, even tax returns from
labor taxes will be higher: the labor supply is xed, but wages will be higher due to the
higher capital stock and openness. Hence, total tax revenues have to be higher under
trade.
Secondly, if the tax rate on capital is higher than 33:1%, then - ceteris paribus again
- the trade equilibrium collapses into autarky. As the Norths tax rate on capital
income rises, the Norths steady-state capital-labor ratio decreases relative to the that of
the South. Thus, for a high enough KN (above 33:1%), transport costs make trade not
protable. Hence, for higher tax rates the La¤er curves under autarky and trade coincide.
As a result, the La¤er curve becomes twin-peaked: the slope is positive initially, becomes
negative, turns suddenly positive again and then nally turns negative.
The three dotted vertical lines denote - from the left to the right - the revenue maxi-
mizing tax rate under trade (26:7%), the benchmark tax rate used for calibration (27:3%),
and the revenue maximizing tax rate under autarky (50:7%). Note that taking the conse-
quences of trade into account has strong implications as far as scal policy is concerned:
under trade, the actual marginal tax rate in the US, as measured by Carey and Rabesona
(2002), turns out to be slightly larger than the revenue-maximizing rate, and therefore
reaches the slippery sideof the curve. In autarky, instead, the actual tax rate remains
quite far from the peak.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
5.1 The Distribution of Capital Shares
Our calibration procedure parameterizes the  (z) distribution using empirical evidence
on the US sectorial structure and taking the implications of our theoretical trade model
literally. Two alternative procedures, based on the same data, may seem natural. The rst
one consists in tting our polynomial on the actual US distribution of capital intensities
without extrapolating the left-hand tail. This is more conservative from an empirical
perspective, but not so faithful to our theory, as we attribute the sectorial shares of the
interval (zN ; 1] to the whole interval [0; 1] Our second alternative takes our argument to
the extreme, and extrapolates the capital intensity distribution not only on the left-hand
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Figure 5: The Northern La¤er curve for di¤erent degrees of trade integration.
side, but also on the right-hand one, in order to span the full range of possible capital
intensities [0; 1]. This second approach could be justied by noting that the level of
disaggregation of the available sectorial data is quite coarse, and some of the highest (and
lowest) capital shares could have simply been hidden by the aggregation process.
The rst panel of Table 2 summarizes the main results for the three parameterizations
discussed above. Notice that the cross-sector dispersion of capital intensities has an
obvious e¤ect on trade: the more disperse the distribution, the more room for taking
advantage of comparative advantage and therefore more trade. More importantly, both
alternative procedures generate results that are in line with the outcome of the benchmark
parametrization. We do not graph the corresponding La¤er curves, as they are all very
similar.
5.2 Trade Costs
The degree of openness, summarized by the trade cost , is another key feature in our
framework. Figure 5 plots the La¤er curve in the North for four di¤erent values of the
trade cost (ceteris paribus). These generate trade shares in GDP ranging from 50% to
150% of our benchmarks trade share. A lower trade cost boosts trade and specialization
and therefore capital accumulation in the North. This makes the La¤er curve expand
upwards and to the right, shifting the revenue-maximizing tax rate to the right.
The implications for our results, as summarized in the second panel of Table 2, are
straightforward: for the given actual US tax rate, equal to 27:3%, an increase in the degree
of openness will reduce the steady-state feedback e¤ect under trade, for both government
revenues and the net scal position. Furthermore, it will reduce the distance between the
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Elast. inter. Dynamic feedback Dynamic feedback
substitution in steady state Half life
 Net scal position Gov. rev. Net scal pos.
0:80 0:55 14 16
1:00 0:59 12 14
1:20 0:62 11 14
Table 3: Alternative elasticities of intertemporal substitution.
actual tax rate and the revenue maximizing tax rate, bringing the North possibly back to
the upward sloping side of the La¤er curve.25
5.3 The Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is key in determining the speed of capital
accumulation, and therefore the speed of convergence towards the steady state. Table
3 summarizes our main results for some alternative values of  that lie symmetrically
around our benchmark value. Almost all variables of interest remain unaltered, except
for the dynamic feedback for the net scal position. The speed of convergence as measured
by the half life - the number of periods needed to cover half their way to the new steady
state - increases slightly with , as expected.
6 Concluding Remarks
Opening the neoclassical growth model to trade changes its quantitative implications
regarding the e¤ects of taxation in a rather stark way. Given the shrinking size of the US
economy relative to the world, and its relatively high degree of openness, our set-up seems
to be a better workhorse for understanding the e¤ects of tax policies than the standard
closed-economy Ramsey model. At the same time, ours is still an incomplete model, as
we ignore sources of comparative advantage other than capital abundance and, perhaps
more importantly, new-tradetheory features explaining intraindustry trade. This is left
for future work.
For simplicity, we have assumed away international capital mobility, which is an im-
portant issue in the area of taxation. Notice, however, that allowing for capital mobility
would not change the models steady-state results. If anything, it would make the models
results stronger over the transition to the steady state, as the country reducing the capital-
income tax rate would attract capital inows from the rest of the world: this would yield
even stronger dynamic feedback measures.
An issue that usually arises in connection with international capital mobility is that
of international tax competition. The e¤ects on the South of a tax cut in the North are
not dramatic in our benchmark calibration, but suggest that the South might have an
incentive to retaliate.We also leave this topic for future work, as our model is not well
equipped to address the behavior of welfare-optimizing governments: one would need a
25Note that, for  = 1:7, the actual and the revenue-maximizing tax rates reported in Table 2 almost
coincide, and therefore the one-percentage-point tax cut we are examining takes the economy to the
upward sloping side of the La¤er curve, since the dynamic feedback is less than unity. If the tax rate is
reduced by a marginal amount, and therefore the economy remains on the slipperyside, the dynamic
feedback would remain (marginally) larger than one.
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less simplistic government side, in which government expenditure raises the representative
consumers utility (or enhances productivity in the production function) and there is thus a
trade-o¤ to an income tax cut between the utility loss from lower government expenditure
and the e¢ ciency gain from lower taxation.
Another issue regarding government behavior that we have ignored is the treatment
of government decits. Since we were mainly interested in a comparison between autarky
and trade, we do not think our balanced budget assumption is that misleading, and leave
this issue as well as part of our research agenda.
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A Appendix: Equilibrium Conditions
A.1 Autarky Equilibrium Conditions
1. Commodity prices:
Pj = exp
Z 1
0
ln pj(z)dz

= 1; (37)
pj (z) = b
 
z; j; rj; wj

=

ja (z)
 1
r
(z)
j w
1 (z)
j : (38)
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2. Goods market clearing:
yj (z) = xj (z) =
PjYj
pj (z)
; (39)
where PjYj = rjKj + wjLj.
3. Factor market clearing:Z 1
0
@b
 
z; j; rj; wj

@r
yj (z) dz = Kj; (40)Z 1
0
@b
 
z; j; rj; wj

@w
yj (z) dz = Lj: (41)
A.2 Trade Equilibrium in the Presence of Frictions
A.2.1 Equilibrium Conditions
1. Commodity prices: For z 2 [0; zN),
pN(z) = pS(z) = vb (z; S; rS; wS) : (42)
For z 2 [zN ; zS],
pj(z) = b
 
z; j; rj; wj

: (43)
For z 2 (zS; 1],
pS(z) = pN(z) = b (z; N ; rN ; wN) : (44)
2. Goods market clearing: For z 2 [0; zN),
yN(z) = 0 yS(z) = xS(z) + xN(z): (45)
For z 2 [zN ; zS],
yj(z) = xj(z): (46)
For z 2 (zS; 1],
yS(z) = 0 yN(z) = xS(z) + xN(z): (47)
3. Factor market clearing:Z 1
zN
@b(z; N ; rN ; wN)
@r
yN(z)dz = KN ; (48)Z 1
zN
@b(z; N ; rN ; wN)
@w
yN(z)dz = LN ; (49)Z zS
0
@b(z; S; rS; wS)
@r
yS(z)dz = KS; (50)Z zS
0
@b(z; S; rS; wS)
@w
yS(z)dz = LS; (51)
4. Marginal commodity conditions:
b
 
zj; j; rj; wj

= b
 
zj;  j; r j; w j

: (52)
5. The numeraire:
pS(0) = 1: (53)
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B Appendix: Steady State with Trade
This appendix establishes the condition under which we can have a steady state with
trade in which countries N and S produce ranges [zN ; 1] and [0; zS], respectively. Given
that the two countries have got the same discount factor and depreciation rate, in steady
state,  
1  KN
 rN
PN
=
 
1  KN
 rS
PS
: (54)
We need to make this equation compatible with the equilibrium conditions discussed
above.
The price indices PN and PS can be expressed as
PN = exp
Z zN
0
ln [bS(z)] dz +
Z 1
zN
ln [bN(z)] dz

= (55)
= zN exp

 
Z 1
0
ln [a(z)] dz   zN lnS   (1  zN) lnN +
+
Z zN
0
(z)dz ln rS +
Z zN
0
[1  (z)] dz lnwS+
+
Z 1
zN
(z)dz ln rN +
Z 1
zN
[1  (z)] dz lnwN

;
PS = exp
Z zS
0
ln [bS(z)] dz +
Z 1
zS
ln [bN(z)] dz

= (56)
= 1 zS exp

 
Z 1
0
ln [a(z)] dz   zS lnS   (1  zS) lnN +
+
Z zS
0
(z)dz ln rS +
Z zS
0
[1  (z)] dz lnwS+
+
Z 1
zS
(z)dz ln rN +
Z 1
zS
[1  (z)] dz lnwN

:
From (52), the marginal commodities zS and zN must satisfy
bS (zS) = bN (zS) ; (57)
bS (zN) = bN (zN) ; (58)
respectively. From (57) and (58),
wN
wS
= 
2
(zS) (zN )

rN
rS

: (59)
From (57),
rN
rS
=
"
 1
N
S

wN
wS
(zS) 1# 1(zS)
: (60)
From (59) and (60),
rN
rS
= 
2[(zS) 1]
(zS) (zN )
 1N
S
: (61)
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From (54), (55), (56), (59), and (61),
N
 
1  KN

S (1  KS )
=  > 1; (62)
where
 = 2
"
zN +
(zS   zN) (zS) 
R zS
zN
 (z) dz + 1   (zS)
 (zS)   (zN)
#
> 0: (63)
Thus, we need N
 
1  KN

> S
 
1  KS

.
C Appendix: List of Sectors
Farms; Agricultural services, forestry, and shing; Metal mining; Coal mining; Oil and gas
extraction; Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels; Construction; Lumber and wood products; Fur-
niture and xtures; Stone, clay, and glass products; Primary metal industries; Fabricated metal
products; Machinery, except electrical; Electric and electronic equipment; Motor vehicles and
equipment; Other transportation equipment; Instruments and related products; Miscellaneous
manufacturing industries; Food and kindred products; Tobacco products; Textile mill prod-
ucts; Apparel and other textile products; Paper and allied products; Printing and publishing;
Chemicals and allied products; Petroleum and coal products; Rubber and miscellaneous plastics
products; Leather and leather products; Railroad transportation; Local and interurban passen-
ger transit; Trucking and warehousing; Water transportation; Transportation by air; Pipelines,
except natural gas; Transportation services; Telephone and telegraph; Radio and television; Elec-
tric, gas, and sanitary services; Wholesale trade; Retail trade; Banking; Credit agencies other
than banks; Security and commodity brokers; Insurance carriers; Insurance agents, brokers, and
service; Other real estate; Holding and other investment o¢ ces; Hotels and other lodging places;
Personal services; Business services; Auto repair, services, and parking; Miscellaneous repair
services; Motion pictures; Amusement and recreation services; Health services; Legal services;
Miscellaneous professional services.
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